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Resolving Ambiguity in the FCPA through 
Compliance with the OECD Convention on 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials  
ERIC J. SMITH
†
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1970s, the investigation into the Watergate scandal 
exposed corruption at the highest level of government.1 Less well 
known are the various corporate bribery schemes the investigations 
uncovered, including the discovery by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of over $300 million in potential bribes to foreign 
officials from over four hundred U.S. companies.2 Americans 
responded by demanding greater corporate accountability, and 
Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to 
prevent and sanction American corruption in international business.3 
Despite this new authority, deregulation remained the dominant 
ideology of the time period, and the commercial world continued to 
operate largely free of restrictions throughout the 1980s and 90s.4  
 
† Executive Notes Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2011–2012; J.D., 
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, May 2012. Thank you to 
Professors Michael Van Alstine and Peter G. Danchin and all the editors of the Maryland 
Journal of International Law for their invaluable assistance with this article. 
 1. H. Lowell Brown, Avoiding Bribery When Doing Business Overseas: A Primer on 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 20 ME. BAR J. 78, 78 (2002). See also Melysa Sperber, 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 679 n.2 (2002) (―Congress passed 
the FCPA to restore public confidence in the business community after a series of bribery 
scandals tarnished corporate America‘s image at home and abroad.‖).  
 2. Fraud Section, Crim. Div., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Antibribery Provisions http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-
guide.pdf [hereinafter FCPA Guide]. 
 3. Sperber, supra note 1, at 679 n. 2. 
 4. See Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND 
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 89 (2010) (―Despite the scandals and crises that marked 
the 1990s . . . Wall Street translated its growing economic power into political power and . . . 
the ideology of . . . deregulation became conventional wisdom in Washington on both sides 
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Recently, however, the United States Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and the SEC have cracked down and steadily increased both 
the number of investigations and the penalties sought under the 
FCPA.5 In fact, prosecution of FCPA violations has increased 
exponentially every year since 2005.6 In 2010, half of the two billion 
dollars in judgments and settlements secured by the DOJ‘s Criminal 
Division came from FCPA enforcement.7 Furthermore, whereas they 
formerly targeted primarily business entities, recent FCPA 
prosecutions have implicated more individuals than ever before, 
including many corporate officers and directors.8 Prosecutors hope 
this pursuit of individual employees will act as a significant deterrent 
to bribery, as the corporate form ―cannot provide a safe haven‖ for 
the officers, even following the resolution of an action against the 
company itself.9  
While many companies have responded to the growth in FCPA 
prosecutions by creating expanded compliance programs,10 the 
continually expanding reach of private enterprise leaves many 
violators beyond the reach of U.S. enforcement authorities.11 
Furthermore, payments to foreign officials remain a part of the 
 
of the political aisle.‖). See also id. (describing the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 
and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 as ―only confirmed trends that had begun in the 
1970s, and signified that the federal government would no longer attempt to resist the desires 
of,‖ industry). 
 5. Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS. 
LAW. 1243, 1247 (2008).  
 6. See id. at 1247 (noting the increase in FCPA activity from thirty-five prosecutions 
and seventeen investigations in 2005 to sixty-seven prosecutions and sixty investigations in 
2007). See also Don Lee, Doing Sticky Business in China; A Pasadena Firm Gets Caught up 
in a Market Rife with Corruption, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at A1. (―Currently, at least 91 
cases are open, triple the number four years ago . . . .‖).  
 7. Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Department of Justice Secures More Than $2 
Billion in Judgments and Settlements as a Result of Enforcement Actions Led by the 
Criminal Division (Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/ 
11-crm-085.html.  
 8. Jeffrey Clark et al., Anti-Corruption, 44 INT‘L LAW., 451, 451 (2010).  
 9. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4 (2010) 
(statement of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Attorney General).  
 10. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 1272 (―Many companies, especially U.S.-based 
companies, have responded to heightened FCPA enforcement by installing comprehensive 
anti-corruption compliance programs.‖).  
 11. See, e.g., Colleen A. Conry, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act in the 
Global Healthcare Industry, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 9–11 (2010) (describing the 
global reach of the pharmaceutical industry and the attendant FCPA implications).  
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commercial landscape in emerging markets around the world.12 
Fortunately, many nations are now subject to the same prohibitions as 
U.S. businesses,13 yet ambiguities in the FCPA and its vigorous 
application by domestic enforcement authorities still disadvantage 
American commercial interests by subjecting them to prohibitions 
that do not apply to companies in much of the world.14  
In the competition-driven private sector, the United States has 
historically demanded a level playing field.15 Perhaps in response to 
such demands, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) drafted the Convention on Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(Convention).16 Despite the existence of the Convention, a lack of 
parity between the Convention and the FCPA remains due to 
vigorous U.S. enforcement of the FCPA. By aligning enforcement of 
the FCPA with the international standards in the Convention, the U.S. 
could achieve the parity desired in the business world. Furthermore, 
shifting the focus on corporate ethics to the international framework 
already in place would provide the comprehensive approach to 
bribery prevention that enforcement authorities demand. Moreover, 
by following the prohibitions of the Convention, the United States 
could act as a model for other nations and remain a leader in 
international commerce and the prevention of bribery.  
This comment will show how international law and the 
ratification of the Convention require the SEC and the DOJ to align 
their interpretation of the FCPA with the Convention. Part II begins 
with a review of the statutory language of the FCPA.17 After 
introducing the FCPA, Part II also explores the most significant areas 
 
 12. See, e.g., Mary Anastasia O‘Grady, Democrats and Haiti Telecom, WALL ST J., Mar. 
15, 2010, at A21 (describing Haiti as ―pure pay to play‖). 
 13. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105–43, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at 
http://ww.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf [hereinafter OECD Convention]. 
 14. See infra Part III.A.  
 15. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 1 at 30–35 (narrating the historical attempts to 
limit concentrated financial power). 
 16. See OECD Convention, supra note 16, pmbl. (―Recognising that achieving 
equivalence among the measures to be taken by the Parties is an essential object and purpose 
of the Convention . . . .‖). In fact, a number of multinational conventions exist, see infra note 
102, but this paper will focus on the OECD Convention on account of its effectiveness, 
particularly in the creation and enforcement of implementing legislation in member states. 
See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2012).  
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
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of ambiguity in the statute.18 Part II.B reviews the language of the 
Convention and the implementing legislation of a few of the 
Convention‘s significant parties.19 Finally, Part III.A notes where the 
FCPA and the Convention differ,20 and Part III.B explains why the 
applicable law requires an interpretation of the FCPA that fits more 
closely with the Convention.21 This alignment with international law 
would clarify certain elements of the FCPA for courts, business 
entities, and individuals, and achieve the desired parity in 
international business. 
I. THE TEXT OF THE FCPA AND THE CONVENTION  
A. The FCPA 
The FCPA prohibits payments to foreign officials by U.S. 
businesses and individuals for the purposes of:  
(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign 
official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign 
official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful 
duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper 
advantage . . . in order to assist the company in obtaining or 
retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any 
person.22 
The FCPA prohibits the making of such payments by ―issuers,‖23 
―domestic concerns,‖24 and since 1998,25 ―any person.‖26 A 
 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. See infra Part II.B. 
 20. See infra Part III.A. 
 21. See infra Part III.B. 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006). The FCPA specifically prohibits payments by ―any 
issuer which has a class of securities registered‖ in the United States or ―which is required to 
file reports,‖ or ―for any officer, director, employee, or agent‖ of the company acting on its 
behalf ―to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce 
corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the 
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of 
anything of value to‖ (1) a ―foreign official,‖ (2) ―foreign political party or official thereof, 
or any candidate,‖ or (3) ―any person, while knowing‖ it might end up in the hands of a 
foreign official, political party, or candidate. Id. § 78dd-1(a)(1)–(3).  
 23. Id. § 78dd-1(a). An issuer is any company that has securities registered with the SEC 
under § 12 of the 1934 Exchange Act or that is required to file reports under §15(d) of that 
act. Id. The FCPA also contains ―accounting provisions,‖ which apply only to issuers. 
Sperber, supra note 1, at 683. These provisions require companies ―to keep accurate books 
and records in order to fairly report the transactions of the corporation,‖ in order to prevent 
concealment of bribery through creative accounting practices. Id. at 683 & n. 15.  
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a). The FCPA defines a domestic concern as: 
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prohibited payment may consist of ―any money, or offer, gift, 
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of 
value.‖27 The violator must also have acted corruptly and made the 
payment in order to obtain or retain business. Additionally, one 
violates the FCPA if he gives anything of value to a third party with 
knowledge that it will be ―offered, given, or promised‖ to a foreign 
official to obtain or retain business.28  
The FCPA, therefore, has five elements for criminal liability: 
(1) An issuer, domestic concern, or any other person, 
makes; 
(2) an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization 
of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, 
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of 
anything of value;  
(3) to a foreign official, political party, or candidate;  
(4) corruptly;  
(5) in order to assist such (issuer, domestic concern, or 
person) in obtaining or retaining business for or 
with, or directing business to, any person.29 
 
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; 
and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, 
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its 
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the 
laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth 
of the United States. Id. § 78dd-2(h). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). The expansion of liability under the FCPA to ―any person‖ in 
1998 occurred in a Congressional amendment to implement U.S. obligations under the 
OECD Convention. Sperber, supra note 10, at 680. Article 1 of the OECD Convention 
requires that ―[e]ach party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is 
a criminal offense under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any 
undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign 
public official. OECD Convention, supra note 14, art. 1.  
 26. The FCPA also proscribes payments by ―any officer, director, employee, or agents of 
such issuer or any stockholder acting on behalf of‖ an issuer, domestic concern, or person. 
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). The Fifth Circuit has held that an employee may not be convicted 
under the FCPA if his employer ―has not and cannot‖ be convicted under that act. United 
States v. McLean, 738 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1984). The court in McLean discusses the 
Eckhardt Amendment, which was added to Title 15 out of concern for the potential that 
corporations might use their employees as scapegoats, as well as to provide employees ―the 
benefit of the superior resources of the corporation in presenting a defense in a criminal 
proceeding.‖ Id. at 658–59. For the text of the Eckhardt Amendment see 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78ff(c)(3), 78dd-2(b)(1)(B)(3). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). 
 28. Id. § 78dd-1(a)(3). 
 29. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a) to -3(a).  
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Subsection (f) of the FCPA defines some of the statute‘s material 
terms. First, it defines a ―foreign official‖ as ―any officer or employee 
of a foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality 
thereof, or of a public international organization,‖ or anyone ―acting 
in an official capacity‖ for one of those same bodies.30 Second, the 
statute defines knowledge as awareness or ―a firm belief.‖ Therefore, 
the statutory knowledge requirement for third party payments is 
satisfied when one has ―a firm belief‖ that the third party will give 
the money to a foreign official.31  
The statute provides a few ways to avoid liability. First, the 
FCPA contains an exception for payments to facilitate or expedite 
standard governmental procedures,32 often referred to as ―grease‖ 
payments.33 Second, an FCPA defendant may have an affirmative 
defense if the bribe was lawful under the written laws and regulations 
of the foreign official‘s country.34 Third, a defendant may also have 
an affirmative defense if the payment was a ―reasonable and bona 
fide‖ expenditure directly related to a product demonstration or the 
performance of a contract.35  
Jurisdiction under the FCPA occurs under both the territorial and 
nationality principles.36 Together, these quintessential jurisdictional 
principles allow a state to regulate any conduct occurring within its 
territory or having a significant effect therein (territorial), as well as 
any conduct by its nationals occurring anywhere in the world 
 
 30. Id. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A). 
 31. Id. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). Compare this standard with the knowledge standard 
from American criminal law, where one acts ―knowingly if he is aware that that result is 
practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.‖ 
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  
 32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-1(f)(3). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3). Permissible ―grease‖ payments to foreign officials include 
those made for the purpose of:  
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to 
do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental papers, such as 
visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and 
delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or 
inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone 
service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting 
perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a 
similar nature. Id. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(i)–(v). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1). 
 35. Id. § 78dd-1(c)(2). 
 36. FCPA Guide, supra note 2, at 3.  
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(nationality).37 In other words, jurisdiction under the FCPA exists 
over non-nationals only if their actions connect them territorially with 
interstate commerce.38 However, through the nationality principle, 
jurisdiction exists over bribes by ―United States person[s]‖ without 
any linkage to interstate commerce.39 Therefore, foreign corporations 
and foreign nationals may only be liable under the FCPA if they use 
the mails or another instrumentality of interstate commerce to make a 
bribe, but U.S. nationals may be held liable for any bribe to a foreign 
official. 
Enforcement of the FCPA is done by both the SEC and the 
DOJ.40 The SEC handles civil enforcement of violations by issuers, 
while the DOJ handles civil enforcement of violations by domestic 
concerns and foreign companies, as well as all criminal enforcement 
of FCPA violations.41 Both agencies have significantly increased the 
number of FCPA prosecutions over the past five years,42 prioritizing 
FCPA enforcement as ―second only to fighting terrorism.‖43 
Additionally, a few courts have allowed private individuals to bring 
FCPA claims under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act.44 
In addition to the investigation and prosecution of FCPA 
violations, the DOJ monitors FCPA compliance through the FCPA 
Opinion Procedure. Created as part of the 1988 Congressional 
Amendments to the FCPA45 and contained in a massive trade bill,46 
 
 37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
402(1)–(2) (1987). 
 38. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a) to -3(a).  
 39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i). 
 40. Sperber, supra note 1, at 692 & nn. 82–83. Private rights of action against FCPA 
violators rely on the ―Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (―RICO‖).‖ 
FCPA Guide, supra note 2, at 1 (―An action might be brought under RICO by a competitor 
who alleges that bribery led to the defendant winning a foreign contract.‖).  
 41. FCPA Guide, supra note 2, at 2. 
 42. Conry, supra note 12, at 1. 
 43. Don Lee, Doing Sticky Business in China; A Pasadena Firm Gets Caught up in a 
Market Rife with Corruption, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at 1.  
 44. Sperber, supra note 1 at 692 & n. 82; FCPA Guide, supra note 2, at 3. (―[A]n action 
might be brought under RICO by a competitor who alleges that bribery led to the defendant 
winning a foreign contract.‖).  
 45. See Julia Christine Bliss & Gregory J. Spak, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1988: Clarification or Evisceration, 20 LAW & POL‘Y INT‘L BUS. 441, 444, 449 (1988).  
 46. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5003(a), 
(c), 102 Stat. 1107, 1417, 1422 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). The impetus for the 1998 amendments was a concern that the FCPA hindered 
American businesses in the international market. United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 
684 (S.D. Tex. 2002).  
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this procedure allows any ―issuer‖ or ―domestic concern‖ facing 
potential liability under the FCPA ―to obtain an opinion of the 
Attorney General as to whether certain specified, prospective—not 
hypothetical—conduct conforms with the Department‘s present 
enforcement policy.‖47 The applicable regulations then provide that 
the Attorney General‘s office will return an opinion on the situation 
within 30 days after receiving a completed request.48 If the Attorney 
General approves of the requestor‘s conduct, the requestor receives a 
―rebuttable presumption‖ that the conduct was legal in any future 
enforcement action.49  
Few cases exist interpreting the elements of the FCPA and 
commentators consider much of the statute subject to varying 
interpretations.50 Some even suggest that the FCPA‘s ambiguity may 
rise to the level of unconstitutionality,51 but the statutory language 
likely does not reach the required level of vagueness.52 The statute‘s 
ambiguity does, however, create a great deal of uncertainty for those 
subject to its provisions. As a result of the statute‘s uncertain breadth, 
companies and business leaders subject to the FCPA often choose to 
pay a fine rather than litigate their charges and risk receiving an 
unfavorable judgment, which could have more costly and 
unpredictable effects on a company‘s good will.53 Due to the 
frequency with which FCPA violations proceed to settlement, and the 
dearth of litigation, the law of international bribery lacks the level of 
appellate review required to act as a check on prosecutorial 
aggression. 
 
 47. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2010). 
 48. Id. § 80.8.  
 49. Id. § 80.10. 
 50. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 1250; Stacy Williams, Grey Areas of FCPA Compliance, 
17 CURRENTS INT‘L TRADE L. J. 14, 16 (2008) (noting the many ambiguous terms in the 
FCPA and its failure to provide definitions); Conry, supra note 12, at 15 (commenting on the 
―potential pitfalls faced . . . when dealing with foreign officials‖).  
 51. Kay, 513 F.3d at 440 (―Defendants argue that the statute failed to give fair notice that 
their conduct was illegal and that proceeding to trial with the late arriving clarification of the 
Act violated their due process rights.‖); United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 189 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (―[T]he portion of the indictment charging [the defendant] with conspiracy 
to violate the FCPA contravenes the constitutional fair notice requirement.‖). 
 52. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1267 (―Despite the available ‗vagueness‘ arguments in FCPA 
cases, it would be difficult for a defendant to convince a court applying the Lanier test that 
the term ‗instrumentality thereof‘ is so vague and ambiguous that it is not reasonably clear 
enough for a common individual to understand its meaning‖). 
 53. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1248.  
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As companies subject to the FCPA try to establish compliance 
with the statute to avoid the significant penalties imposed,54 the 
ambiguity in the statute causes great difficulty for business leaders 
and those advising them. While the Opinion Procedure allows 
resolution of particularly confusing questions, it remains cumbersome 
and time consuming.55 Fast-paced commercial enterprises in the 
midst of a business transaction may not be able to afford the thirty-
day waiting period expected for the return of a DOJ opinion. 
Moreover, in the absence of significant case law, commentators have 
been forced to assemble insights into the meaning of key FCPA terms 
from limited sources, including the relevant Opinion Procedure 
releases and public statements by officials at the DOJ.56  
A few courts have had opportunities to clarify the terms of the 
FCPA. In United States v. Bodmer, the government alleged that the 
defendant, Hans Bodmer, acted as the agent of two Delaware 
businesses when he gave bribes to Azerbaijani officials in order to 
secure shares in the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic 
(SOCAR).57 Bodmer argued that prior to the 1998 amendments to the 
FCPA, foreign nationals were not subject to criminal penalties for 
violations of the Act. He claimed that because his conduct had 
occurred prior to those amendments, the rule of lenity mandated the 
dismissal of the FCPA charges against him.58 Over the government‘s 
argument that the FCPA had always applied to ―non-resident foreign 
nationals who had ‗minimum contacts‘ with the United States,‖59 the 
court went on to review the legislative history leading up the 1998 
amendment. The Bodmer court found that, ―after consideration of the 
statutory language, legislative history, and judicial interpretations of 
the FCPA, the jurisdictional scope of the statute‘s criminal penalties 
[was] still unclear.‖60 Applying the rule of lenity, the court dismissed 
 
 54. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010), 3–4 
(statement of Michael Volkov, Esq., Partner, Mayer Brown LLP) [hereinafter Volkov].  
 55. The opinion procedure allows for a requestor to receive a DOJ interpretation of a 
hypothetical situation within 30 days of a completed request, which could result in a lengthy 
wait from the time of the requestor‘s initial inquiry. See 28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2010). 
 56. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1251–55.  
 57. United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 178–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 58. Id. at 181. A rule of statutory construction, the rule of lenity requires that an 
ambiguous criminal statute be construed in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. 
Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 264 (2000).  
 59. Id. at 182.  
 60. Id. at 187.  
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the FCPA charges against Bodmer for lack of fair warning.61 
Although the court upheld the defendant‘s fair warning argument, 
that argument relied on retroactive application of the statute, rather 
than on the FCPA‘s ambiguity.62 
In a related case, United States v. Kozeny, the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York considered whether a payment 
made was ―lawful under the written laws and regulations‖ of the 
receiving nation.63 If so, this would have provided the defendant an 
affirmative defense to an act otherwise prohibited under the FCPA.64 
The defendant, Frederic Bourke, Jr., a former client of Hans Bodmer, 
was charged with violation of the FCPA for his participation in the 
same scheme involving shares of SOCAR. Bourke argued that 
Azerbaijani criminal law permitted his payments.65 The court found 
that although Azerbaijani law ―relieved‖ the defendant of ―criminal 
responsibility,‖ the FCPA focuses on the ―payment, not the payer,‖ 
and the payment remained unlawful.66 Therefore, the initial payment 
was still illegal.67 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that the 
possibility of extortion could allow Bourke to argue that he ―lacked 
the requisite corrupt intent to make a bribe‖ that violates the FCPA.68  
In United States v. Kay, the defendant, David Kay, was charged 
with FCPA violations including payments made to reduce customs 
duties and taxes on rice exports to Haiti.69 In defense, Kay argued 
that the FCPA ―failed to give fair notice that [his] conduct was 
 
 61. Id. at 189, 192–93.  
 62. Id.  
 63. 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
 64. See supra Part II.B.  
 65. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 537. This argument was based on the fact that the 
payments were the product of extortion, and Bourke reported them to the President of 
Azerbaijan. Id.  
 66. Id. at 539. The court in Kozeny treated the question of foreign law as a question of 
law per Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 538. Rule 26.1 requires 
a ―party intending to raise an issue of foreign law‖ to ―provide the court and all parties with 
reasonable written notice.‖ FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1. That rule also allows the court to ―consider 
any relevant material or source—including testimony—without regard to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.‖ Id.  
 67. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 540.  
 68. Id. at 540. At trial, the court instructed the jury on the required corrupt intent for an 
FCPA violation, defining that intent as ―knowledge of and the intention to further its 
objective of corruptly and willfully bribing foreign officials.‖ United States v. Kozeny, 664 
F. Supp. 2d 369, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). That jury found Mr. Bourke guilty, and his Rule 29 
motion for acquittal or alternatively a new trial under Rule 33 was denied. Id. at 372, 397.  
 69. 513 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 513 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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illegal.‖70 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
agreed and granted Kay‘s motion to dismiss on these grounds, 
holding that the FCPA‘s prohibition of payments to ―obtain or retain 
business‖ did not include payments made to reduce customs duties 
and taxes.71 On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit refuted Kay‘s fair 
notice argument, finding that the statute is not ―so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ 
as to its application.‖72 The Fifth Circuit interpreted the FCPA‘s 
business nexus requirement literally and broadly, holding that the 
FCPA prohibited the defendant‘s conduct, provided it was intended 
to ―assist in obtaining or retaining business.‖73 On remand, the 
district court declined Kay‘s motion to dismiss for lack of fair 
warning,74 and following a second appeal the Fifth Circuit denied 
Kay‘s argument again.75 The court found that its earlier decision had 
not expanded the scope of the FCPA and affirmed the conviction.76 
Despite refuting the defendant‘s vagueness arguments, the Fifth 
Circuit acknowledged in Kay that significant ambiguity does exist in 
the FCPA‘s business nexus element.77 The court found it necessary to 
conduct a lengthy statutory analysis to determine the meaning of 
―obtaining or retaining business,‖78 and the case also required 
multiple appeals to reach a conclusion. Although the court found no 
lack of fair warning,79 the lengthy judicial process in Kay exemplifies 
how greater clarity in the FCPA would benefit both companies 
attempting to comply with its provisions and courts seeking greater 
judicial economy. 
 
 70. Id. at 440. 
 71. United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686–87 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 72. Kay, 513 F.3d at 441 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)). The 
court in Kay applied all four tests of fair notice: (1) ―vagueness of the statute‘s language‖; 
(2) ―court‘s retroactive enlargement of the scope of a statute‖; (3) ―the rule of lenity‖; and 
(3) the ―touchstone principle.‖ The FCPA satisfied none of these tests. Id. at 446.  
 73. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 761 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit conducted 
a lengthy statutory analysis of the FCPA, focusing particularly on the ―business nexus‖ 
element of the statute. Id. at 741–55.  
 74. Kay, 513 F.3d at 440.  
 75. Id. at 461.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Kay, 359 F.3d at 744. 
 78. Id. at 746 (―As the statutory language itself is amenable to more than one reasonable 
interpretation, it is ambiguous as a matter of law. We turn therefore to legislative history in 
our effort to ascertain Congress‘s true intentions.‖). See also id. at 738.  
 79. Kay, 513 F.3d at 446.  
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Many other ambiguities in the FCPA have not yet received any 
clarification from the courts. Interpretation of these elements is left to 
the speculative judgments of attorneys and the Opinion Procedure 
process.80 First, a significant amount of uncertainty exists regarding 
who qualifies as a foreign official to whom payments are 
prohibited.81 The FCPA defines a foreign official as ―any officer or 
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency or 
instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization,‖ or 
anyone ―acting in an official capacity‖ for one of those same 
bodies.82 This definition clearly includes elected or appointed 
government officials. But the public and private sectors often blend, 
and many national governments own shares in various commercial 
enterprises.83 In those circumstances, the FCPA‘s definition of a 
foreign official remains open for speculation as to what constitutes an 
―instrumentality‖ of a foreign government. 
Second, the ―grease payments‖ exception for ―routine 
governmental actions‖ also results in confusion for those subject to 
the FCPA.84 While the statute provides some concrete examples of 
governmental actions for which one may permissibly exchange 
money,85 such as obtaining permits, it concludes with an allowance 
for payments to procure other ―actions of a similar nature.‖86 This 
broad statement prompts the question of why a payment to a foreign 
official to secure a permit would be permitted, but a standardized 
payment to secure efficient customs treatment (as in Kay) would not 
be ―of a similar nature.‖87 Furthermore, the question remains whether 
permissible payments to secure ―routine‖ governmental actions may 
vary among nations and cultures along with their routines.  
Third, uncertainty exists regarding the content of the ―reasonable 
and bona fide expenditure‖ exception. The enforcement authorities 
have interpreted this exception very narrowly.88 Excessive expenses 
not directly tied to conduct business or which appear excessive in 
 
 80. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1251–55.  
 81. See infra Part II.D.  
 82. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2006). 
 83. Conry, supra note 12, at 3 (noting how the enforcement authorities‘ interpretation of 
the foreign official element of the FCPA may lead to ―unexpected liability‖). 
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2006). 
 85. Id. § 78dd-1(b). See supra note 29 for a list of permissible ―routine governmental 
actions.‖ 
 86. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A) (2006). 
 87. Compare id. with United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (S. D. Tex. 2002). 
 88. Conry, supra note 12, at 24.  
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light of the circumstances may result in million dollar fines for 
violators.89 As with many of the statutory terms, however, there 
remains a significant gap between the interpretation of the 
enforcement authorities and the actual language of the statute, 
considering the breadth of potential interpretations by courts and 
laypersons.  
B. THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977, and for many years the 
United States stood alone in prohibiting bribery of foreign officials.90 
This unilateral prohibition on bribery placed U.S. companies at a 
disadvantage in global markets.91 In response to the complaints of 
U.S. business leaders, the government began a campaign to persuade 
other nations of the necessity of preventing international bribery.92 
While most nations traditionally prohibited bribery of their own 
officials, multinational conventions regulating cross-border bribery 
began to spring up only recently, aided by the urgings of Congress 
and the Executive Branch.93 The most prominent of these 
conventions is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials 
in International Business Transactions, which resulted from the 
realization that bribery had become ―a widespread phenomenon in 
international business transactions.‖94 Signed in 1997 and entered 
into force in 1999, current signatories include 34 OECD member 
countries and four countries that are not OECD members.95  
 
 89. Id. at 19.  
 90. Sperber, supra note 1, at 679-80.  
 91. President‘s Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
664 (May 1, 1998) [hereinafter President‘s Message]. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Brown, supra note 1, at 76 (noting the recent vintage of multinational 
conventions).  
 94. OECD Convention, supra note 14, pmbl. See also United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003) (listing 
―multilateral instruments to prevent and combat corruption‖). 
 95. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Entry into Force of the Convention, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2057484_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2011); OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3343, 
en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). The four non-
member countries are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, and South Africa. Id. The United States 
ratified the Convention without reservations, and Congress acted to amend the FCPA 
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The Convention requires all parties to:  
take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it 
is a criminal offence under its law for any person 
intentionally to offer, promise or give any pecuniary or 
other advantage . . . to a foreign public official . . . in order 
to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in 
the conduct of international business.96  
Article 1 goes on to define the term ―foreign public official as ―any 
person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office in a 
foreign country,‖ as well as ―any person exercising a public function 
for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public 
enterprise.‖97  
Many signatories to the Convention have enacted legislation to 
implement the required prohibitions.98 While the Convention requires 
only ―functional equivalence‖ amongst the laws of its signatories, it 
also prohibits the use of derogations in ratification.99 Accordingly, 
many nations‘ implementing legislation closely tracks the language 
of the Convention. The experiences of Australia, Germany, Hungary, 
and the United Kingdom are illustrative. 
Australia‘s Criminal Code Amendment (Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials) Act of 1999 defines all of the significant terms for 
the offense of bribery of a foreign official.100 The statute specifies 
that one may not give a foreign official ―any benefit,‖ a term not 
limited to tangible property. Importantly, and in great contrast to the 
FCPA, the Australian statute goes into great detail regarding who 
qualifies as a foreign public official.101 The statute draws a clear line 
regarding employees of state owned enterprises. When a foreign 
government holds more than fifty percent of the shares or voting 
power, or the ability to appoint more than fifty percent of the 
directors of a company, then one may not exchange money for 
business with an employee of that company. The statute also 
 
according to the OECD shortly thereafter. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 783, 753–55 (5th 
Cir. 2004).  
 96. OECD Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(1). 
 97. Id. ¶ 4. 
 98. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation, supra note 19.  
 99. OECD Convention, supra note 14, pmbl., para. 8.  
 100. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) div 70.1 (Austl.). 
 101. Id. 
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prohibits payments to employees of companies whose directors are 
clearly influenced by the foreign government.102  
German implementing legislation follows the Convention very 
closely. The German statute prohibits the giving of any advantage to 
a foreign official in exchange for any advantage in an international 
business transaction.103 The German definition of foreign official 
focuses on government employees, including members of the 
judiciary and the military.104 In close cases, the statute focuses on 
whether the individual receiving the bribe exercises a ―public 
function.‖105 
Hungary was second to the United States with 27 individuals 
sanctioned for bribery of foreign officials between 2000 and 2009,106 
but significant skepticism remains concerning the scope and 
application of the Hungarian statute.107 Peripheral nations like 
Hungary will likely experience the most difficulty in obtaining 
widespread governmental adherence to an anti-bribery regime. Both 
Hungary‘s location in east-central Europe and its post-communist 
identity make it prone to continuing concerns regarding corruption.108 
Furthermore, Hungary‘s implementing legislation contains 
considerable uncertainty regarding the ―quid pro quo‖ requirement, 
which is similar to the FCPA‘s business nexus element.109 The 
United States and other western nations must closely monitor the 
actions of their own companies operating in Hungary and other 
similar nations in order to ensure that the prohibitions of the 
Convention achieve the parity they intended.  
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Gleichstellung von ausländischen mit inländischen Amtsträgern bei 
Bestechungshandlungen [Act on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions], Sep. 10, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II [BGBL II], 
art. 2, § 2, translated in Act on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/3/2377209. 
pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).  
 104. Id. art. 2, § 1. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Working Group on Bribery Data on Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention, 
OECD, 3 (June 2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/15/45450341.pdf. 
 107. See Hungary: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 
Recommendations on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, OECD, 
39–41 (May 6, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/34/34918600.pdf. 
 108. See id. at 6–7.  
 109. Id. at 39–40.  
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The United Kingdom stands poised to join the United States as a 
leader in combating international bribery. In April 2010, the U.K. 
passed the Bribery Act of 2010 (Bribery Act).110 The Act prohibits 
the giving of a bribe to a government official or an individual 
exercising a ―public function‖ on behalf of a government to obtain or 
retain business or a business advantage.111 In an expansion that far 
exceeds the scope of the Convention, the Bribery Act also prohibits 
the giving of a financial advantage to any person in exchange for the 
―improper‖ performance of a ―relevant activity.‖112 Jurisdiction is 
extended only to acts which take place in the territory of the U.K.,113 
in accordance with the Convention‘s mandate for territorial 
jurisdiction.114 But the Bribery Act prohibits the same ―grease‖ 
payments for which the FCPA provides an exception,115 and the Act 
only provides affirmative defenses for certain situations relating to 
the national defense.116 While it appears that the U.K. statute may 
vault the nation into the lead role for international bribery prevention, 
its enforcement by U.K. authorities will ultimately decide the weight 
that international business interests ought to place on it.117  
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FCPA AND THE CONVENTION  
A. Material Differences Between the FCPA and the Convention  
 The Convention differs from the FCPA in two material ways. 
First, they diverge regarding the proscribed benefits following a 
payment to a foreign official. Second, the two documents define the 
term foreign official differently.  
The Convention prohibits bribing a foreign official ―in order to 
obtain or retain business or other improper advantage.‖118 The 
Convention thus captures a very broad range of behavior, including 
bribes to obtain new contracts, as well as those intended to reduce 
 
 110. Press Release, Ministry of Justice, Bribery Act Implementation (July 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/newsrelease200710a.htm. 
 111. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1 (Eng.).  
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. § 12. 
 114. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
 115. See § 4. 
 116. Id. § 12.  
 117. Prior the enactment of the Bribery Act, the U.K. sanctioned only one individual 
between 2000 and 2009. See Working Group on Bribery Data on Enforcement of the Anti-
Bribery Convention, supra note 103, at 4 tbl.  
 118. OECD Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(1). 
Eric macro 5/22/2012 12:51 PM 
2012] RESOLVING AMBIGUITY IN THE FCPA 393 
expenses or gain favorable treatment in the country whose official 
receives the bribe. The FCPA, on the other hand, utilizes a more 
complex ―business nexus element‖ to define the proscribed 
behavior.119  
The initial version of the FCPA left out any language referring to 
an ―improper advantage,‖ but after Congress ratified the Convention, 
it added that language in amendments to the FCPA.120 Rather than 
including the prohibition of an ―improper advantage‖ along with 
other ―obtained business‖, however, Congress chose to place it in 
front of the business nexus requirement, so that the FCPA prohibits 
bribes to a foreign official in order to secure an ―improper advantage‖ 
which assists the briber in ―obtaining or retaining business.‖121 
Therefore, while ―obtaining or retaining business‖ clearly refers to 
the awarding of contracts, the extent to which the FCPA prohibits the 
acquisition of other favorable treatment is unclear. The ―grease 
payments‖ exception further confuses the issue, by creating a list of 
specific exceptions along with an undefined catch-all phrase at the 
end.122 
In United States v. Kay, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the FCPA‘s 
―business nexus requirement‖ to include bribes made for the purposes 
of favorable tax and customs treatment.123 The Kay court extensively 
reviewed the legislative history of the FCPA, concluding that, 
―Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments 
intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining 
or retaining business for some person.‖124 While the court observed 
that there might be a gap between what the FCPA and the Convention 
each prohibit, it found that the Convention clearly prohibited the 
payments in question.125 The fact that Congress ratified the 
 
 119. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 754 (5th Cir. 2004). The FCPA‘s business 
nexus element seems to contain an extra step, prohibiting payments made ―in order to assist 
[the briber] in obtaining or retaining business.‖ 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (2006). 
 120. Kay, 359 F.3d at 754. 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (2006). 
 122. See supra Part I.A.  
 123. Kay, 359 F.3d at 755. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 754. The court explained itself in a footnote: 
We recognize that there may be some variation in scope between the 
Convention and the FCPA. The FCPA prohibits payments inducing official 
action that ‗assists . . . in obtaining or retaining business‘; the Convention 
prohibits payments that induce official action ‗to obtain or retain business or 
other improper advantage in the conduct of international business.‘ Potential 
variation exists because it is unclear whether the Convention‘s ‗other improper 
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Convention ―without any reservation, understandings, or alterations‖ 
furthered the Kay court‘s willingness to interpret the FCPA broadly, 
prohibiting the defendants‘ payments to foreign officials.126 While 
the Kay court willingly closed the gap between the FCPA‘s business 
nexus requirement and the proscribed benefits under the Convention, 
that decision only controls the Fifth Circuit, and uncertainty remains 
because of the language of the FCPA and the potential for varying 
interpretations by other courts. 
The different definitions of a foreign official contribute to further 
uncertainty for those subject to the FCPA. The Convention defines a 
foreign public official as any official of a foreign government as well 
as ―any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, 
including for a public agency or public enterprise.‖127 The FCPA, 
however, defines a ―foreign official‖ as ―any officer or employee of a 
foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality 
thereof, or of a public international organization,‖ or anyone ―acting 
in an official capacity‖ for one of those same bodies. Clearly both 
statutes prohibit bribes to all elected and high level appointed 
officials, but uncertainty exists regarding employees of state-owned 
agencies, enterprises, or instrumentalities. The OECD defines a 
―public enterprise‖ as one ―in which the government holds a majority 
stake,‖ or ―over which the government may exercise a dominant 
influence either directly or indirectly.‖128 The FCPA, on the other 
hand, provides no definition of what constitutes an instrumentality of 
a foreign government. While the OECD prohibits payments to 
officials or those exercising a public function, the FCPA‘s prohibition 
of payments to ―any officer or employee‖ of any government or 
instrumentality appears to capture a broader range of behavior. In 
sum, the OECD contains a narrower, clearer standard. By setting a 
broader, more unclear standard, the United States increases 
uncertainty and impedes American commercial success.  
This lack of guidance poses an unnecessary problem as 
companies attempt to remain compliant in the face of increased 
FCPA enforcement. A large number of foreign states have varying 
degrees of ownership and control of business entities, including those 
 
advantage in the conduct of international business‘ language requires a business 
nexus to the same extent as does the FCPA.  
Id. at 755 n.68 (omissions in original).  
 126. Id. at 755 & n.68.  
 127. OECD Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(4). 
 128. Corruption: A Glossary of International Criminal Standards, OECD, 29 (2007), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/9/39532693.pdf. 
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within their borders and those in other nations.129 Successful business 
with these companies often calls for behavior with uncertain 
implications under the FCPA. This uncertainty is unnecessary, 
however, as Congress has already ratified the Convention, which 
provides clear guidance on prohibited activities. Therefore, by 
interpreting all ambiguities in the FCPA in accordance with U.S. 
obligations under the Convention, the United States could continue to 
lead the world in preventing bribery in international business, while 
continuing to honor its obligations under international law. 
B. The Effect of the Convention on the FCPA  
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution states that ―all treaties 
made . . . under the authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme law of the land.‖130 In the exercise of this authority, 
Congress encouraged the creation of the Convention,131 ratified it, 
and passed legislation to amend the FCPA in accordance with its 
obligations thereunder.132 Both international law and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence abound with support for the binding effect of treaties 
duly ratified.133 Consequently, the Convention is the ―supreme law of 
the land.‖134 Despite its support for the Convention, however, 
Congress failed to provide definitions under the FCPA that measure 
up to those provided in the Convention.135 Insofar as the FCPA 
prohibits less conduct than the Convention, the United States violates 
its obligations under domestic and international law. Therefore, 
Congress must amend the statute to give full credit to the Convention. 
Alternatively, Courts may rectify that failing through consistent 
 
 129. Conry, supra note 12, at 5. 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 131. See infra Part I.E. 
 132. Sperber, supra note 1, at 680. 
 133. Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the United States 
has signed (but not ratified), states that a treaty applies throughout the territory of all 
signatories. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 29, May 23, 1969, 1115 
U.N.T.S. 331 (―Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.‖); Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP‘T STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/ 
70139.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (noting that ―U.S. Senate has not given its advice or 
consent‖ to the Vienna Convention). See also Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683 (1887) 
(―[T]reaties made by the United States and in force are part of the supreme law of the land, 
and that they are as binding within the territorial limits of the states as they are elsewhere 
throughout the dominion of the United States.‖). 
 134. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 135. See supra Part I.D. 
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interpretation of the FCPA in line with the prohibitions of the 
Convention.  
The Convention‘s prohibition of bribery likely applies to the 
United States as a rule of customary international law as well. ―A rule 
of international law is one that has been accepted . . . by the 
international community of states by international agreement.‖136 
When an international agreement is ―intended for adherence by states 
generally‖ and is ―in fact widely accepted,‖ it may ―lead to the 
creation of customary international law.‖137 The Convention has been 
signed by 38 countries. Furthermore, the Convention is clearly 
―intended for adherence by states generally,‖ because ―all countries 
share a responsibility to combat bribery in international business 
transactions.‖138 The mere creation of the Convention was based on 
international recognition that bribery is unacceptable, and its 
prevention in international business requires adherence by all states. 
Therefore, the Convention may have risen to the level of customary 
international law, further solidifying U.S. obligations to assure 
compliance with the Convention through prohibition of all activity 
prohibited by the Convention. 
Furthermore, traditional rules of treaty interpretation support a 
reading of the FCPA that is consistent with the Convention. In 
interpreting a statute within the bounds of international law, U.S. 
courts have recognized the long-standing principle that ―an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if 
any other possible construction remains.‖139 The Fifth Circuit 
followed this principle by avoiding a conflict of laws when it read the 
FCPA‘s ―business nexus element‖ in conformity with the 
Convention.140 This interpretation should provide the standard for 
other courts‘ interpretations of the business nexus element, as well as 
any other element of the FCPA that diverges from the Convention.  
In addition to ensuring that no elements of the FCPA prohibit 
less activity than under the Convention, the United States should 
ensure that the FCPA does not prohibit any more activity than the 
Convention. Prosecutions of FCPA violations have reached all time 
 
 136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
102(1)(b) (1987). 
 137. Id. §102(3). 
 138. OECD Convention, supra note 14, pmbl., para. 2. 
 139. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 140. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755 n.68 (5th Cir. 2004).  
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highs in recent years.141 These prosecutions have resulted in massive 
liability on the part of many U.S. companies, as well as their officers, 
directors, and employees.142 While no justification exists for bribery, 
comity concerns abound with regard to prosecutions of international 
businesses and foreign nationals, and parity requires equal standards 
for all entities and individuals subject to international bribery laws.143 
Prior to the creation of the Convention, both Congress and the 
Executive Branch had an acute awareness for the disadvantages 
suffered by U.S. businesses under the unilateral prohibitions of the 
FCPA.144 In response to these disadvantages, Congress urged the 
drafting of the Convention in order to achieve the parity desired in 
commerce.145 Shortly after ratification of the Convention, Congress 
enacted implementing legislation to achieve the goals of the 
Convention by amending the FCPA.146 Because a treaty, particularly 
one with implementing legislation, becomes the ―supreme law of the 
land,‖ the amended FCPA should be interpreted in accordance with 
the intentions of Congress and the Executive branch when the 
Convention was ratified in 1998. Currently parts of the FCPA, as 
enforced by the DOJ, capture more than was intended by Congress, 
and achieve the opposite result. In order to comply with the intentions 
of Congress, which focused on promoting parity for U.S. businesses, 
the DOJ must temper its enforcement of the FCPA, and courts must 
interpret the statute with regards to Congress‘ intention to alleviate 
the disadvantages to U.S. businesses by such vigorous enforcement. 
Policy reasons also call for more moderate prosecution under the 
FCPA. When the enforcement agencies relentlessly prosecute U.S. 
companies for FCPA violations, they risk injuring the 
competitiveness of those companies in the global marketplace. 
Certain countries in the world operate on a ―pay to play‖ basis.147 
Prohibiting U.S. companies from competing in ―pay to play‖ nations 
 
 141. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 142. Jeffrey Clark et al., Anti-Corruption, 44 INT‘L LAW. 451, 451–63 (2010) (noting 11 
prosecutions against companies, and 17 prosecutions against individuals for violations of the 
FCPA). 
 143. While these concerns remain valid for all state parties to the Convention, Article 5 of 
the Convention does prohibit consideration of the ―national economic interest,‖ or the 
―potential effect upon relations with another State.‖ OECD Convention, supra note 14, art. 5.  
 144. See supra President‘s Message note 88; S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2 (1998). 
 145. S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2. 
 146. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 
112 Stat. 3302. 
 147. E.g., O‘Grady, supra note 13 (regarding Haiti). 
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can injure their economies as well, and often ―pay to play‖ nations 
are those in the developing world. Fear of prosecution under the 
FCPA, due to zealous enforcement coupled with ambiguous statutory 
provisions, may stifle investment in the developing world, reducing 
the availability of the capital necessary for economic growth.148 
Because the provisions of the Convention are already valid in the 
United States, reliance on the Convention would suffice to combat 
bribery, as well as to relieve some of the disadvantages to U.S. 
businesses and the burgeoning economies of ―pay to play‖ nations.  
In addition to aligning the FCPA with the Convention, U.S. 
legislators, enforcement authorities, and courts could help domestic 
companies and foreign development by changing their approach to 
the FCPA. They could apply the exceptions for grease payments and 
routine governmental actions with more fidelity to the text of the 
FCPA, especially for payments in developing nations that need 
economic stimulus. Congress enacted the FCPA to restore confidence 
in the integrity and morality of the American market.149 Doing 
business in ―pay to play‖ markets such as Haiti often requires 
payments that would currently result in substantial fines and jail time 
under the FCPA. Allowing these payments would not erode 
confidence in the American market. By allowing more payments to 
facilitate business, the United States could permit companies to pay 
foreign officials in order to reduce customs and tax obligations, 
especially in nations where it is customary to do so. Furthermore, 
U.S. enforcement agencies could temper their prosecution of the 
FCPA while companies scramble to add compliance programs and 
internalize the prohibitions of the FCPA.  
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. role in combating bribery in international business is 
commendable, and the end of bribery remains a necessary goal for 
 
 148. Id. O‘Grady explains: 
An American entrepreneur who does business in the Caribbean recently 
explained the Haitian landscape to me this way: ―We did not bother with Haiti 
as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act precludes legitimate U.S. entities from 
entering the Haitian market. Haiti is pure pay to play. The benefit of 
competitive submarine cables would be transformative for the Haitians. Instead, 
they were stuck with Clinton cronies taxing the poor.‖ Id.  
 149. H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4–5 (1977), (noting that bribery is ―unethical,‖ and 
―counter to the moral expectations and values of the American public,‖ which in turn 
―erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market system‖).  
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world markets.150 But businesses should operate on a level playing 
field, with success depending on merit rather than who can afford to 
pay the largest bribes.151  
U.S. enforcement authorities have increased FCPA prosecutions 
to unparalleled highs.152 Paired with ambiguity in statutory 
construction, this unwavering enforcement stifles U.S. companies in 
their competition for business abroad and prevents the receipt of U.S. 
investment in many developing nations.153 First, courts and 
legislators should ensure that the FCPA prohibitions match those of 
the Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.154 As other 
nations follow, this statutory convergence will increase parity in 
international business while ensuring U.S. compliance with treaty 
obligations.155 International cooperation on the interpretation of the 
Convention will resolve a great deal of ambiguity in both the FCPA 
and the implementing legislation of other nations.156 Second, the SEC 
and DOJ should reduce the penalties sought and match their 
enforcement of the FCPA with education regarding its terms. While 
the FCPA has been very lucrative for the DOJ, those same funds that 
fill government coffers have left the accounts of some of the world‘s 
largest employers, reducing needed global capital and hampering 
development.  
 
 150. See supra Part I. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra Part II.A. 
 154. See supra Part III.B. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
